Myanmar update- geopolitics and regional unrest
Zooming out from the roiling strife in Burma, cause and effect are playing out on a vaster canvas than might seem immediately apparent. As much as despots and dictators would like to hew to the narrative that “our conflict is only internal and doesn’t involve anyone else/is no one else’s business”, this lie has been put to rout repeatedly.
With the Tatmadaw, it is especially egregious given that the military is still receiving support from multinational corporate funding(1), employment of tech from China(2), and purchasing arms from Russia(3). The stage is set for Burma to return to the bad old days for military despotism. Also, it’s important to remember that this is not a civil war. Right now, the various ethnic groups that form Myanmar’s polity are united against this brutal military force.
That the unrest in the country is directly tied to support from regional and global players out to make a buck is one side of the story on the international field; the other is the effect it is having on the region and abroad in terms of humanitarian crises and stresses among other nations.
As Binalakshmi Nepram pointed out recently(4), the tri-state region of Northeastern India is having to adjust to the influx of refugees fleeing into the area. Bangladesh and Thailand are finding increased stresses on their border regions and economy, as well(5). In sum, with around 200,000 (at least) number of IDP and fleeing war(6), a region already fraught with economic and social imbalance is nearing a greater threshold for more.
It should go without saying that it is the poorest nations and populations who will bear the brunt of this. Already, the ethnic and indigenous minorities of Burma are fighting for survival.
Additionally, the largest looming threat for Myanmar - yes, more than the military - is the ongoing COVID pandemic(7). Already there are 157, 277 number of cases and 3,334 number of deaths(8) and these figures are unlikely to go down in the absence of a capable response to the pandemic by way of vaccination and for that matter, the stability to ensure measures to mitigate it (i.e., social distancing, quarantining, etc.) The lack of deployment to secure vaccinations among the population was already hampered by the remoteness of much or the rural populations and the absence of a coordinated regional response among the ASEAN countries. The advent of the delta variant strain with its increased communicability and lethality is another cause for concern.
That General Hlaing and his cronies began their push at a time when the world was just coming to terms with a global pandemic is a sign of the selfishness, the cowardice that are the most telling characteristics of these little men. Like the base cowards they are, they mounted their coup when the country was, is still, at its most vulnerable and throwing caution to the wind, destabilize a region all too often fraught with other issues.
It is beyond tragic that their enablers lack the decency, humanity, or even common sense to not fuel the flames the Tatmadaw is fanning. The exacerbation of misery within Myanmar is and should be of grave concern to all in the region and abroad. (9)
It is the poorest nations and their most disenfranchised and marginalized people who are suffering under the strain of this pandemic; but this suffering is amplified a thousandfold in Myanmar by the punishing warfare incited by a cabal of power-hungry military wannabes. That the corporations that continue to support the military either by direct (or indirect) funding or supplies are doing so with impunity and without fear of sanction or reprisal speaks much to the moral vacuity of the international community.
To be sure, the U.S., the E.U., and the U.K. have enacted sanctions to rein in the military and cut off access to funds(10), but that’s not effective enough to staunch the flow of support from Russia’s supplying of weaponry or China’s aid with facial recognition and surveillance technology.
If much of this scenario seems bleak, there is hope that the concerted efforts in Myanmar by the people to fight back against the military, particularly in those areas far from the urban centers but ultimately, in coordination with groups across the country will eventually take their toll on the armed forces. There have been defections from the army and significant gains have been made in the Kachin and Chin states, Mandalay, and other areas. (11)
Aside from armed resistance, in Yangon and other cities, workers are continuing to strike and support one another in resistance.(12) As much as the military has struggled to strangle the internet, VPNs sprout like mushrooms repeatedly.
If the issue of what to do seems garbled at the international level, there are step those of us outside Myanmar can take to help out. Following are organizations and resources that can assist you in determining how to get involved and help out where you can.
Information and News Organizations and Ways to Get Involved and Help:
Campaign for Myanmar just launched and I recommend checking their site out for a wealth of up to the minute information and action items you can pursue.
U.S. Campaign for Burma Twitter feed
International Campaign for the Rohingya
There may be duplications, but here is more:
The Coup in Myanmar: Resources to learn more and What you can do
Sources/Footnotes
1. The obscure and obscuring business practices and groups funding the military: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/26/follow-the-money-myanmar-coup-puts-pressure-on-army-businesses. Reporters Without Borders call to stop funding for the military: https://rsf.org/en/news/stop-funding-myanmars-generals-rsf-tells-10-multinationals. It is also worth noting that as early as August of 2019, a UN fact-finding mission found and exposed business ties to the military and called for targeted sanctions: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24868&LangID=E.
2. For Chinese tech deployment: https://www.csis.org/analysis/tatmadaw-deploys-chinese-made-uavs. To be sure, because Myanmar lacks a sophisticated enough infrastructure to support the tech, the fall back on more analog approaches is more often employed. For more: https://southeastasiaglobe.com/myanmar-military-surveillance/.
3. The Russia-Myanmar relationship has a benefit for both Myanmar and Russia in countering China’s influence and, of course, giving Russia increased presence in Southeast Asia. The nuances are greater than that, but this is a good place to start: https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/05/russia-and-the-myanmar-coup-an-opportunity-for-increased-arms-exports/. This report from the UNOCHR in June of 2019 lays out a comprehensive map of who supplies what to the military: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/Infographic2_Arms_and_Military_Equipment_Suppliers.pdf.
4. Facebook post: https://www.facebook.com/100000121877755/posts/6335974209749912/. See also https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/over-6000-myanmar-nationals-in-indias-northeast/.
5. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2021/4/2/myanmars-coup-fallout-tumbles-into-a-regional-emergency and https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/07/island-jail-middle-sea/bangladeshs-relocation-rohingya-refugees-bhasan-char# underscore the issues not only of the general flight but also the ongoing displacement/marginalization of the Rohingya.
6. This figure is based on an EU report from this past April. It does not include Rohingya populations that were already fleeing state sanctioned terror. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/printpdf/293_en. Other sources are: Relief Web’s report here: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MMR_HNO_2020_FINAL_131219.pdf and data sets provide here: https://data.humdata.org/dataset/idmc-idp-data-for-myanmar?force_layout=desktop.
7. The military has arrested doctors and is preventing a solid response to the epidemic: https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n704. The devastation is, at present, incalculable. https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/myanmar-covid-19-outbreak-hits-health-system-shattered-after-coup. It may not need to be emphasized, but spillover to other countries is also a concern, as well. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/21/myanmar-doctors-sound-covid-warning-as-neighbours-see-record-cases.
8. https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/myanmar/
9. ASEAN’s response has been lackluster, at best, but the implications of that response are clear: https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/myanmar-coup-weakens-southeast-asia-security-and-cooperation. There seems to be a likelihood that the junta’s aggression will exacerbate “democratic regression” in a region where strongmen and forceful tactics are often lauded: https://aspeniaonline.it/the-regional-implications-of-myanmars-coup/. Lastly, while American and European sanctions are likely to have mostly indirect effects, any concerted effort by regional players is likely to be a mixed bag reflecting diverse interests and political approaches: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/myanmar-coup-international-response-asean-by-thitinan-pongsudhirak-2021-04.
10. Indeed, I have serious questions about these targeted sanctions. Absent direct dialog and/or a show of medium, if not hard power, I have substantial doubts that the businesses already linked to the military or the military itself are going to be very much swayed. https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/eu-uk-and-us-adopt-sanctions-against-myanmar-over-military-coup.html.
11. In Kachin, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/19/amid-myanmars-post-coup-crisis-an-armed-rebellion-brews . In Chin, . In Mandalay and other areas: https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/mandalay-pdf-declares-war-on-junta and https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b168-taking-aim-tatmadaw-new-armed-resistance-myanmars-coup,
12. The resistance, armed and otherwise, is well-covered here: https://www.npr.org/2021/05/25/1000042970/as-resistance-to-myanmars-coup-grows-the-country-slips-further-into-chaos.
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